This file was dowloaded from the institutional repository Brage NIH -brage.bibsys.no/nih Standal, Ø. F., Aggerholm, K. (2016 One of the main topics in philosophical work dealing with physical education is if and how 2 the subject can justify its educational value. Acquisition of practical knowledge in the form of 3 skills and the provision of positive and meaningful embodied experiences are central to the 4 justification of physical education. The purpose of this article is to explore the relationship 5 between skill and embodied experience in physical education through the notion and concept 6 of habit. The literature on phenomenology of skill acquisition is first considered. In particular, 7
the disembodied mind, has a long history that found its expression in Peters' view of 1 education. Thus, contra this disembodied understanding of education, it has been argued that 2 physical education as a body-linked subject provides students with opportunities to learn 3 about one self as an embodied being, and that such learning is educationally valuable (see e.g. 4 Stolz, 2014; Whitehead, 2001). 5
Our aim is not to assess the successfulness of those arguments. We simply note that 6 acquisition of practical knowledge in the form of skills and the provision of positive and 7 meaningful embodied experiences are central to the justification of physical education 1 . Given 8 the emphasis put on acquisition of skills and embodied experiences, the purpose of this article 9 is to explore the relationship between skill and embodied experience in physical education 10 from a philosophical perspective through the notion of habit. 11
Skills and habits: phenomenological approaches 12
Largely speaking, the work on justification of physical education has been situated in the 13 analytical tradition of philosophy (McNamee, 2005) . To a lesser extent, some authors have 14 relied on Continental philosophy, especially the phenomenological tradition (e.g. Arnold, 15 1979; Connolly, 1995; Standal, 2015; Stolz, 2014; Whitehead, 2001 ). Those authors have 16 argued that the phenomenological understanding of the constitution of the lived body could be 17 relevant to the study of human movement. Since phenomenology is the study of lived 18 experience, phenomenology of skill acquisition appears to be a suitable starting point for 19 understanding the relationships between skill acquisition and embodied experiences. 20 The Skill Model: Application and Critique. 1 Philosophers of sport have taken up an interest in the phenomenology of skill acquisition 2 (e.g. Breivik, 2008; Breivik, 2010 Breivik, , 2013 Eriksen, 2010; Moe, 2005 Moe, , 2007 . Moe (2005) , for 3 example, has criticized the information-processing theory that underlies the cognitivist 4 perspective on skilled motor behavior. The alternative posited by Moe was based on 5 philosophical theories of Hubert Dreyfus and John Searle. The work of Dreyfus and the 6 phenomenological philosophy he has advanced has become a particularly influential paradigm 7 for understanding the phenomenology of skilled sports performances (Breivik, 2007; Sutton, 8 McIlwain, Christensen, & Geeves, 2011). Although a survey of this literature would be 9 valuable, it is for our purpose more relevant to engage with the underlying ideas of the Skill 10 model proposed by Dreyfus and Dreyfus (e.g. Dreyfus, 2002; Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986 ) and 11 its perspective on phenomenology of skill acquisition 12
The Skill model describes a five-step progression in skill acquisition, from novice to 13 expert 2 . This is a process in which the learner gradually advances from being dependent on 14 decontextualized and explicit rules and instructions through an intermediate phase in which 15 she becomes increasingly involved in the situation, but still dependent on detached rule-16 following for coping with the learning situation. As the learner becomes more proficient, her 17 'theory of the skill, as represented by rules and principles, will […] gradually be replaced by 18 situational discriminations accompanied by associated responses' (Dreyfus, 2002, p. 370) . In 19 other words, experience, the right forms of feedback, and personal involvement in the 20 learning situation can gradually free the learner to perform a skill without having to follow 1 explicit rules. 2
The work of Dreyfus and its application to sport has helped expel the intellectualist idea 3 that thinking comes before acting. It has also installed the human body as not only an object 4 of knowledge, controlled by the mind. The body is also the subject of knowing. This point is 5 important for physical education because it shows the closely embodied relationship between 6 the knowledge objects (the actions, activities and practices of movement) and the student as 7
an an embodied, knowing subject (Standal, 2015) . Although influential, the Skill model of 8
Dreyfus and Dreyfus has also received criticism. Two particular points are relevant in relation 9 to our purpose here, namely the prejudice against teaching and a problem with experience 10 inherent in the model. 11
The first critique is that there is a prejudice against teaching built into the model. One 12 feature of the Skill model is that teaching takes place at the first three stages, in which the 13 learners rely on rules and maxims provided by a teacher. At the higher levels, the teacher or 14 coach simply disappears and the learner is thought to develop through a feedback loop 15 referred to as the intentional arc. Selinger and Crease (2002) find this disappearance  16 problematic, because 'a lived, embodied subject lacks an objective purchase on its own 17 performing process' and is therefore open to 'being better disclosed to outsiders, whose 18 intercessions may then help the subject to perform better' (p. 260). In other words, an outsider 19 perspective on performance could be helpful. 20
Further, the Skill model mischaracterizes teaching. The role of the teacher in the Skill 21 model is merely to provide rules and maxims. Effective teaching, says Selinger and Crease 22 'involves modeling and demonstration and is addressed to the specific performances of 1 specific embodied learners. Since these performances differ from body to body, the 2 knowledge embodied in [teaching] cannot be reduced to rules of thumb' (ibid.). Clearly, it 3 would be problematic for physical education to rely on a theoretical perspective that 4 undermines the role of the teacher. As such, the critique of Selinger and Crease shows some 5 limitation with applying ideas of phenomenology of skill acquisition to the school subject 6 physical education. This limitation pertains both to practical purposes about how to teach skill 7 acquisition, but also limitations for those who want to justify the educational value of the 8 subject in terms of practical knowledge. 9
The second critique of the Skill model is its relation to embodied experiences. Gunnar According to Dreyfus, Merleau-Ponty uses of the word habitude rather than habilitè (which is 17
French for skills) because he wanted to stress that our skills are embodied, in the sense that 18 'we have our skills' and that this points to skills as 'flexible and situation-sensitive' (Dreyfus, 19 2005, p. 145). 20
Understanding habit as rigid behavior is, however, to rely on a restricted notion of habit 1 (Crossley, 2001) . It is also possible to understand habits as a situation-sensitive, flexible and 2 adjustable ability to act (Aggerholm, 2015a, 64- Merleau-Ponty sought to develop a non-dualistic ontology (Dillon, 1997) . In this ontology, 7
Merleau-Ponty points out the importance of embodiment for our human existence. This could 8 function as a justification for physical education as a body-linked subject (Stolz, 2014 ). There 9 is also a specific and relevant epistemological aspect of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology. 10 Habits are, as he stated 'knowledge in the hands, which is forthcoming only when bodily 11 effort is made, and cannot be formulated in detachment from that effort' (Merleau-Ponty, 12
2002, p. 166). Thus, to recapitulate his phenomenological point, habits are a form of situated, 13 practical and embodied knowledge. This criticism is not a rejection of the phenomenological perspective on habit. Rather, it 18 points to need for a complementary perspective, one that can give put the work of 19 phenomenologists such as Merleau-Ponty into an educational context, without subverting its 20 non-dualistic ontology and practical epistemology. Following Shusterman, we suggest that 21 John Dewey's pragmatist philosophy can do so. 22
A Pragmatist Slant to Skills and Experience 1
In this section, we will turn to pragmatism. First, we will motivate this by arguing for why a 2 turn to pragmatism is useful for the discussing the relationship between skills and embodied 3 experiences. This entails shifting the language from skill to habit. We will argue that this shift 4 in language is not merely semantic. More substantially, speaking about habits rather than 5 skills aligns with pragmatism, without abandoning the phenomenological perspective already 6 introduced. Further, it is helpful in connecting the two justifications for physical education 7 that we are concerned with here. Indeed, we will argue that the pragmatic slant we provide 8
here is relevant for understanding and working with practical knowledge and embodied 9 experiences in PE. Ponty pointed out was the problems of dualistic and mechanistic thinking: 'They both saw 5 that the human body does not passively await external stimuli. Rather, the body, or as Dewey 6 called it, the body-mind matrix, must be attuned to a situation in order to perceive 7 stimulations as cues to action' (Standal, 2015 , p. XXX). 8
One of the relevant insights from John Dewey is that he connects habit to experience: 9
The basic characteristic of habit is that every experience enacted and undergone modifies 10 the one who acts and undergoes, while this modification affects, whether we wish it or 11 not, the quality of subsequent experiences. both an active and a passive part (Dewey, 1938) . On the passive side, experience is something 5 the subject undergoes in the sense that what happens is to some extent beyond the control of 6 the subject. On the active part, the subject actively takes or grasps the experience. This active 7 process is what Dewey referred to as inquiry or reflective thinking. Thus, experience is not to 8 be understood as a one-way traffic, either from the environment to the subject (as in 9 behaviourism) or from the individual to the environment (as in intellectualism). Experience is 10 rather an interaction, or transaction as Dewey would call it in his later works. In this sense, 11
Dewey's position is similar to Merleau-Ponty's, when he criticized both the behaviourist / 12 empiricist and the intellectualist points of view. Merleau-Ponty's argument was that 'neither 13 can grasp consciousness in the act of learning' (2002, p. 33), because they do not (fully) take 14 into account the interaction part of experience. 15
Not all experiences are educative, however. As a consequence of undergoing and 16 grasping experiences, the subject of experience develops physically, intellectually and/or 17 morally. However, for Dewey truly educative experiences are directed towards growth. That 18 is, experiences must be directed towards a desirable end, the value of which 'can be judged 19 only on the grounds of what it moves toward and into' (Dewey, 1938, p. 38) . 20 Dewey distinguished two central criteria for educational experiences, namely continuity 21 and interaction. Continuity means that every experience takes up something from previous 22 experiences and in turn modifies the quality of later experiences. This means that we can only 1 make sense of our current experience in light of previous ones. In educational terms, a 2 consequence of the principle of continuity is that education should be defined as the 3 'reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of experience, and 4 which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience' (Dewey, 1916, p. 61) . 5
The principle of interaction implies that in experience a transaction between an individual 6 and the environment takes place. This is referred to as an interaction between the objective 7 conditions that constitute the environment and the internal conditions of the subject, 8 understood as the needs, desires, purposes and capacities of the individual. In their interaction, 9 these two aspects form a situation 5 (Dewey, 1938) . The duty of the educator, Dewey observes, 10 is to 'determine that environment which will interact with the existing capacities and needs of 11 those taught to create a worth-while experience' (Dewey, 1938, p 
. 45). This means that it is 12
the obligation of the teacher to construct an environment by manipulating the objective 13 conditions so that the learner can have experiences, which match his or her capacities and 14 desires. Failure to construct such an environment, both in terms of adaptation of the material 15 and the "total social set-up of the situation" (ibid.), leads to mis-educative experiences. This 16 highlights the educational responsibility of the teacher. 17
It might seem to be a conflict between habit and Dewey's educational theory. Whereas 18 one can say that habit is what keeps us going, education, conceived as inquiry in Dewey's 19 understanding, makes us stop and think. In other words, habits could be seen as concerned 1 with doing, and even more so a doing which is a repetition of previous acts. Education, on the 2 other hand, is a form of critical thinking, the formation of something new. However, this 3 would be a misunderstanding of Dewey's fundamental way of reasoning in general and in 4 particular a misunderstanding of his conception of habit. 5
First, that line of reasoning sets up an artificial separation between doing and thinking. As 6 is well known, Dewey is often connected to the proverb 'learning by doing'. It is correct that 7
Dewey thought that educational experiences must contain some activity, a form of doing. But, 8 it is one-sided and wrong to think that one learns just by doing. Reflection on the experience, 9 and more specifically, the felt difficulties of experience, is a important for Dewey's 10 educational philosophy. However, it is similarly one-sided to think of reflection on experience 11 as the hallmark of education. Dewey always looked to 'expose a tacit hierarchy in the terms in 12 which people conventionally think… We think we know in order to do; Dewey taught that 13 doing is why there is knowing' (Menand, 2001 , p. 330). 14 Second, as already mentioned, Dewey did not think about habit as mindless activity. 15
Rather, habit was for Dewey an expression for a pre-disposition, not to act in a particular way, 16 but to certain modes of responses. As Noddings (2010) points out, the educational process This presentation of Dewey's pragmatist, educational philosophy puts us in a position to 1 discuss in more detail the concept of habit in relation to acquisition of practical knowledge 2 and provision of embodied experiences. 3
Habits and Physical Education 4
As mentioned in the introduction, there are a myriad of justifications for physical education 5 (Stolz, 2014) . However, the literature on physical education expresses a doubt about whether 6 physical education as a school subject is delivering its promises. Indeed, some argues that the 7 subject is in a state of crisis (Kirk & Macdonald, 1998) to introduce students to a wide range of activities in the hope that they will find something 20 they enjoy enough to make it a life-time activity. They inform students about the health-21 benefits of physical activity, but typically, it turns out to be no deeper than New Year's 22 resolutions. Easy-street approaches to physical education also entertain students. Although 1 there is nothing wrong with being entertained and enjoying physical education, Kretchmar's 2 point is that this approach rests on diversion rather than discipline. More generally, easy 3 streets consist of 4 a brief review of rules, a quick survey of basic skills, very little practice and feedback, 5
and perhaps a little play in only a simplified game form (perhaps, a larger ball, fewer 6 players) so that a lack of skill does not get in the way of having some fun. But skills are 7 not practiced diligently; old habits are never relinquished; new habits are not developed; 8 attitudes are not changed (p. 349. Italics added). 9
These brief reflections contextualize our explorations of habits in physical education. The 10 development of habit is difficult when the educational practice is characterized as wide-11 ranging and shallow in its content. 12
The first point we will take up is implied in Kretchmar's reasoning about the information 13 aspect in the easy street approaches, i.e. that physical education can serve a health promotion 14 function. In Kretchmar's view, however, merely informing about the benefits of physical 15 activity is too shallow. It is worth mentioning that the idea that physical education can serve 16 as a tool for health promotion is widely criticized. Tinning (2010) warns about healthism, i.e. 17 an ideological view that assumes that physical education can contribute to better health 18 'because exercise = fitness = health' (p. 116). Of particular relevance in the context of this 19 article is the argument that an emphasis on health in physical education serves to objectify the 20 students' bodies in manners that are harmful to their well-being (ibid.). The body becomes 21 objectified as a thing that must be exercised and physical activities become technocratic tools 22 to achieve fitness and health. This goes against the justification of the subject where it is 1 thought that physical education should provide students with positive, embodied experiences. 2
We would argue that turning attention to habit in the pragmatist understanding would 3 help to circumvent the problems of merely informing about health benefits and hazards on the 4 one hand, and harmful objectifications on the other hand. If one accepts that an educational 5 value of physical education is to develop habits that support a healthy life, then the 6 educational philosophy of Dewey might give some direction on how physical education 7 should be practiced. One important feature of Dewey's philosophy was that educational 8 experiences must connect with the previous experiences of the students. In other words, a 9
one-size fits all approach to health promotion in physical education must be substituted with a 10 first-person approach where students are encouraged to draw on their own experiences. 11 Thorburn and MacAllister (2013) highlight the importance of experiential learning and 12 reflection on experience for a physical education curriculum, which connects with the lives of 13 the students in order to promote the development of well-being: 14
If such a first person perspective on learning was adopted, then experiential learning 15 could dovetail with the acquisition of knowledge (of skills, fitness, training, and healthy 16 living) in ways that equip students with the habits, skills and values to make coherent 17 well-being decisions in future years (p. 465) 18
Thus, a focus on development of habits through an educational process help us overcome the 19 shallowness of a curriculum which merely informs about the value of living a healthy life, and 20 that potentially informs in a way that objectifies both the students' bodies and the physical 21 activities they engage in. 22
The considerations here point to an apparent need for a conceptual analysis: what are the 1 differences between technique, skill, habit and other concepts that are employed to describe 2 the knowledge objects of physical education? For a more stringent analysis of skill, know-3 how and practical knowledge, see Gunnar Breivik's contribution to this special issue. Clearly, 4
such an analysis should be applied to the physical education context. An important point in 5 this regard is Kirk's (2010) argument that although there is much talk about skill teaching, it 6 should more aptly be termed technique, because what is taught in physical education is to a 7 large extent de-contexualized and not practiced in game-like situations. 8
The development of healthy habits can be considered an important part of physical 9 education, but this kind of development must also be subjected to an ethical analysis of how 10 and why such habits should be developed. Aggerholm (2015b) connects Aristotelean virtue 11 ethics with the development of good habits in physical education. The ethical perspective is 12 also important in Dewey's educational philosophy. Recall here that educational experiences 13 should lead to growth, otherwise they would be mis-educative. A virtue ethical discussion of 14 the habits aimed at developing in physical education warrants further studies, which we 15 cannot pursue further here. However, it leads us to a related issue concerning habits, namely 16 whether habits can help provide embodied experiences. 17 Carlisle (2014) refers to the 'double law of habit': on the one hand, habit makes our 18 actions more precise and effective, but on the other hand, habit leads to a dulling of sensation: 19
In habit, both pleasure and pain are reduced, and even brought to a point of neutrality. 20
Because actions are strengthened by repetition, habit increases the efficiency andaccuracy of our movements -but this strengthening can be a problem when we want to 1 change habits that have become deeply entrenched (p. 31). 2 This is the pharmakon nature of habit: our actions become securer, but our sensations and 3 experiences become weakened. In this regard, it seems that the two justification under 4 consideration here are at odds: acquiring practical knowledge in the form of habits lead to a 5 weakening of the embodied experience of moving. (Recall here the criticism of Dreyfus' skill 6 model from Breivik and Zahavi respectively). 7
For a further illustration of the importance of teaching students to attend to their own 8 experiences of moving, consider the difference between two drinkers: the drunkard and the 9 connoisseur 6 (Carlisle, 2014) . For the former, repetitive drinking leads to less and less taste. 10
On the other hand, the repetition involved in drinking leads the connoisseur to a heightened 11 sense of taste and a refinement of the activity. Thus, the effect of repetition may not 12 necessarily be merely a dulling or weakening of sensation, but rather an increased 13 attentiveness 7 . We could use the same analogy in relation to movement activities in physical 14 education. When skills -or what Kirk (2010) refers to as techniques -are learned, they may 15 become habits that reduce the students' attentiveness to their own bodies. Even more so, one 16 can imagine that habits are cultivated that leads to compulsive exercise addiction, where there 17 is no attention directed to what it is like to move. This is therefore the point where the concept 18 of habit is more appropriate than that of skill. With this broader notion of habit of 1 attentiveness we get an experiential and educational perspective that is not present in 2 discussions about skill or technique. 3
Furthermore, Dewey did not oppose habit to reason and control. Rather, the real 4 opposition for Dewey were between two kinds of habits, 'between "routine", unintelligent 5 habit and "intelligent and artistic habit" that "is fused with thought and feeling"' (Shusterman, 6 2008, p. 205). There is, however, no denying that we have habits that are routine and are 7 performed without conscious monitoring. Walking, for instance, is deeply habitual: we do not 8 consider the mechanical process of walking. Walking is as such an example of an unreflective 9 habit that spontaneously performs our will 8 . However, the habit of walking takes place in a 10 situation: with or without shoes, on different grounds and for different purposes. Thus, it 11 supports other habits. One of the main points of Dewey's educational philosophy was that 12 students must be able to attend to their experiences in order to notice when they come up 13 against a problematic situation, i.e. situations where their habitual way of responding to a 14 situation is not adequate (Rodgers, 2002) . So, when Carlisle (2014) in the above quote calls 15 attention to the problem of changing entrenched, bad habits, Dewey's saw the need for 16 developing habits of embodied attentiveness (Shusterman, 2008 ). Were we dualists, this 17 embodied attentiveness would be the parallel to the habits of mind referred to earlier 18 (Noddings, 2010) . However, Dewey's emphasis on the body-mind (Dewey, 1938 ) rejects this 19 kind of dualistic thinking. Instead, 'we must rely on reflective feelings and habits -because 1 we can't reflect on everything and because such unreflective feelings and habits always 2 ground our very efforts of reflection' (Shusterman, 2008, p. 212) . 3
If physical education truly is to be a body-linked subject (Stolz, 2014) , then one of its 4 primary tasks must be the cultivations of habits of embodied attentiveness. In this sense, the 5 repetition that is needed to cultivate habits (both motor-habits and habits of thinking) is not a 6 blind repetition that leads to automatization, but an active and dynamic process of repeating 7 towards new, different and more refined aspects of movement (Aggerholm 2015a, p. 170 ff). 8
As Dewey (1938, p. 48) pointed out 'the most important attitude that can be formed is that of 9 desire to go on learning'. 10
Conclusion 11
The purpose of this article has been to explore the relationship between skill and embodied 12 experience in physical education from a philosophical perspective through the notion and 13 concept of habit. For that purpose, we have drawn on phenomenological perspectives, in 14 particular the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. This has allowed us to understand habits as an 15 embodied, context-sensitive form of practical knowledge. Furthermore, we have pointed out 16 that in the context of school physical education, an educational perspective that focuses on the 17 development of habits is needed. By drawing on John Dewey's educational philosophy we 18 have sought to give the phenomenological perspective a pragmatic slant that emphasize the 19 development of habits of attentiveness. This implies that students in physical education are 20 not subjected to mindless drilling or blind repetition of (sport) techniques or skills, but that 21 they are rather encouraged and allowed to be attentive. We propose that exploring habit from 22 a philosophical perspective can help us understand the relationship between two of the central 1 justification to physical education, namely the learning of practical knowledge and the 2 provision of embodied experiences. Speaking about habits rather than skills aligns with 3 pragmatism, without abandoning the phenomenological perspective. This raises the need for 4 further conceptual analysis: what are the differences between technique, skill, habit and other 5 concepts that are employed to describe the knowledge objects of physical education? Our 6 modest hope is that this article goes some way in clarifying the potential value of paying more 7 attention to the role of habits, raising new questions for philosophy of physical education. 
